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Abstract
It is now possible to synthesize highly realistic images of
people who don’t exist. Such content has, for example, been
implicated in the creation of fraudulent social-media pro-
files responsible for dis-information campaigns. Significant
efforts are, therefore, being deployed to detect synthetically-
generated content. One popular forensic approach trains a
neural network to distinguish real from synthetic content.
We show that such forensic classifiers are vulnerable to
a range of attacks that reduce the classifier to near-0%
accuracy. We develop five attack case studies on a state-
of-the-art classifier that achieves an area under the ROC
curve (AUC) of 0.95 on almost all existing image genera-
tors, when only trained on one generator. With full access
to the classifier, we can flip the lowest bit of each pixel in an
image to reduce the classifier’s AUC to 0.0005; perturb 1%
of the image area to reduce the classifier’s AUC to 0.08; or
add a single noise pattern in the synthesizer’s latent space
to reduce the classifier’s AUC to 0.17. We also develop a
black-box attack that, with no access to the target classifier,
reduces the AUC to 0.22. These attacks reveal significant
vulnerabilities of certain image-forensic classifiers.
1. Introduction
According to his Twitter account, Andrew Walz, was
a congressional candidate running for office in Rhode Is-
land. He called himself “a proven business leader” with
the tagline “Let’s make change in Washington together.”
Waltz’s Twitter account was complete with his picture, Fig-
ure 1, and a prized blue checkmark, showing that he had
been verified – part of Twitter’s efforts to verify the accounts
of congressional and gubernatorial candidates.
Andrew Walz, however, was not real. He was the
creation of a 17-year-old high-school student. During
his holiday break, this student created a website and
Twitter account for this fictional candidate [2]. The
Twitter profile picture was plucked from the website
thispersondoesnotexist.com. True to its name,
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Figure 1. Andrew Walz was, according to his Twitter account and
webpage, running for a congressional seat in Rhode Island. In
reality, Mr. Walz does not exist, and is the creation of a 17-year
old high-school student. The profile picture (top) of the fictional
candidate was synthesized using StyleGAN2 [26]. A state-of-the-
art [42] synthetic-media detector would have flagged Mr. Walz’s
profile picture (b) as 87% fake. We show, however, that adding a
perceptually indistinguishable perturbation (c) to this photo causes
the detector to classify the resulting picture (a) as 99% real.
and powered by StyleGAN2 [26], this site generates images
of people who don’t exist.
The case of Mr. Walz’s fictional congressional can-
didacy demonstrated how it might be possible to disrupt
our democratic institutions through social-media powered
dis-information campaigns. While this specific example
was a fairly innocuous prank – albeit exceedingly well
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executed – recent reports have revealed how fake social-
media accounts, with synthesized profile photographs, are
being used by purported Russian hackers, trolls, and fraud-
sters [1, 3]. As dis-information campaigns continue to
threaten our democratic institutions, civil society, and eco-
nomic security, it has never been more important to be able
to verify the contents of what we read, hear, and see on-line.
There are, therefore, significant efforts underway to de-
velop forensic techniques to detect synthesized or manipu-
lated audio, image, and video recordings. These techniques
can be partitioned into two broad categories: high-level and
low-level. High-level forensic techniques focus on semanti-
cally meaningful features including, inconsistencies in eye
blinks [29], head-pose [45], physiological signals [14], and
distinct mannerisms [4]. Low-level forensic techniques de-
tect pixel-level artifacts introduced by the synthesis pro-
cess [46, 32, 38, 47]. The benefit of low-level approaches is
that they can detect artifacts that may not be visibly appar-
ent. The drawback is that they, unlike high-level techniques,
struggle to generalize to novel datasets [16], and can be sen-
sitive to laundering (e.g., transcoding or resizing).
Recent work seemed to buck this trend of sensitivity and
lack of generalizability [42, 19]. These techniques discrim-
inate between real and synthetically-generated images that
generalize across datasets and generators. In [42], for ex-
ample, the authors trained a standard image classifier on
images synthesized by one technique (ProGAN [24]) and
showed that this classifier detects synthesized images gen-
erated from nearly a dozen previously unseen architectures,
datasets, and training methods. In addition, this classifier
is robust to laundering through JPEG compression, spatial
blurring, and resizing.
Contributions. We find that neural networks designed to
classify synthesized images [42, 19] are not adversarially
robust. Given an arbitrary image classified as fake, we can
modify it imperceptibly to be classified as real. Building
on work from the adversarial machine learning commu-
nity [40, 11, 31], we investigate the robustness of forensic
classifiers through a series of attacks in which it is assumed
that we have (white-box) or do not have (black-box) full ac-
cess to the classifier’s parameters.
In line with prior work, we find that forensic classifiers
are highly susceptible to such attacks. Our white-box at-
tacks reduce the area under the ROC curve (AUC) from 0.95
to below 0.1 as compared to an AUC of 0.5 for a classifier
that randomly guesses “real” or “fake”. Even when we are
not able to directly access the classifier’s parameters, our
black-box attacks still reduce the ROC to below 0.22.
2. Background & Related Work
We begin by briefly reviewing techniques for creating
and detecting synthetically-generated images as in Figure 1.
Synthetically-Generated Images. The most common ap-
proach to creating images of people (or cats, or objects) that
don’t exist leverages the power of generative adversarial
networks (GAN). A GAN is composed of two main com-
ponents, a generator and a discriminator. The generator’s
goal is to synthesize an image to be consistent with the dis-
tribution of a training dataset (e.g., images of people, cats,
cars, or buildings, etc.). The discriminator’s goal is to deter-
mine if the synthesized image can be detected as belonging
to the training dataset or not. The generator and discrim-
inator work iteratively, eventually leading the generator to
learn to synthesize an image that fools the discriminator,
yielding, for example, an image of a person who doesn’t
exist, Figure 1. Following this general framework, dozens
of techniques have emerged in recent years for synthesiz-
ing highly realistic content, including BigGAN [8], Cycle-
GAN [48], GauGAN [37], ProGAN [24], StarGAN [13],
StyleGAN [25], and StyleGAN2 [26].
Detecting Synthetically-Generated Images. Denote an
image generator as g : Z → X . The input to the generator
is a vector in a latent space Z , and the output is a color im-
age of a pre-specified resolution. Denote an image-forensic
classifier as f : X → R. The input to the classifier is a color
image, x ∈ X , and the output is a real-valued scalar, where
larger values correspond to a higher likelihood that the input
image is fake or synthetically-generated.
We study the robustness of two classifiers: Wang et
al. [42] and Frank et al. [19]. The majority of our effort
is focused on Wang et al., appearing jointly at CVPR’20
with this workshop, but consider Frank et al. to show that
our results are not limited to only one forensic classifier.
The forensic classifier of Wang et al. [42] is based on
ResNet-50 [22] pre-trained on ImageNet [17], and then
trained to classify an image as real or fake. The training
dataset consists of a total of 720, 000 training and 4, 000
validation images, half of which are real images, and half of
which are synthesized images created using ProGAN [24].
The images in this dataset are augmented by spatial blurring
and JPEG compression. The accuracy of this classifier is
evaluated against synthetically-generated images produced
from ten different generators, similar in spirit, but distinct
in implementation to the training images created by Pro-
GAN. The trained classifier is not only able to accurately
classify images synthesized by ProGAN, but also from ten
other previously unseen generators. The classifier is also
robust to simple laundering, consisting of spatial blurring
and JPEG compression.
The forensic classifier of Frank et al. [19] takes a
similar learning-based approach. The authors find that
their classifier can accurately detect synthesized images
from different generators. The authors argue that GAN
synthesized-images have a common spatial frequency arti-
fact that emerges from image upsampling that is part of the
image-synthesis pipeline.
We will also consider a forensic classifier of our creation.
This classifier is trained on 1, 000, 000 ProGAN [24] im-
ages, half of which are real and half of which are fake. Our
training pipeline is substantially simpler than [42], and thus
has an error rate that is roughly three times higher than [42].
The purpose of this classifier, however, is only to act as
a mechanism for creating adversarial examples which can
then be used to attack other classifiers.
Adversarial Machine Learning. It is well established that
machine learning classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial
examples: for a classifier f(·) and input x, it is possible
to construct an additive perturbation δ so that x+ δ is mis-
classified by f(·) [40]. Most strategies for constructing the
perturbation δ, rely on generating the perturbation with re-
spect to the input x through a gradient-descent optimiza-
tion [11, 31]. While most adversarial machine learning
work is on images, such attacks have also proven to be ef-
fective at attacking audio- [12], video- [35], and text- [18]
classifiers. Orthogonal to defenses that detect synthesized
content, related work has developed techniques to apply ad-
versarial perturbations to unmodified images so that when a
neural network attempts to modify it, the resulting image is
meaningless [35].
Attacking forensic classifiers should not simply be con-
sidered a sport. 1 Attacks and counter-measures are an im-
portant part of understanding the reliability of forensic tech-
niques, and pushing these techniques to be more resilient to
intentional and unintentional counter-measures [7]. Indeed,
concurrent work has addressed the strengthening of forensic
classifiers [20, 39].
3. White-Box Attack
To begin, we evaluate the robustness of forensic classi-
fiers to an attacker who has complete access to the classi-
fier. This attacker is therefore able to compute the gradient
of the input with respect to the classifier output, a so-called
white-box threat model. We apply three attacks that have
previously been studied in the adversarial example litera-
ture, and then develop our own attack that subverts forensic
classifiers by modifying the generator’s latent space.
These attacks take the form of modifying synthesized
images so that they are misclassified as real (with one ex-
ception where we devise an attack to misclassify a real im-
age as fake). All images were obtained from the dataset of
94, 036 images released by [42]. On this dataset, their de-
tector achieves an AUC 2 of 0.97. Even after performing
typical laundering strategies in an attempt to conceal traces
1For this reason, we do not release our source code to (however
marginally) increase the difficulty of repurposing our attacks.
2AUC is defined as the area under the ROC curve that compares the
false positive rate to the true positive rate. An AUC of 1.0 corresponds to a
perfect classifier, while an AUC of 0.5 corresponds to a chance classifier.
of synthesis (JPEG compression and spatial blurring), the
classifier AUC remains above 0.94 .
In each attack described below, we operate on a ran-
domly sampled subset of 10, 000 fake images. Each three-
channel (RGB) image is of size 224× 224 pixels with pixel
intensities in the range [0, 1]. The difference between two
pixels will be measured in terms of a 0-norm (`0) or a 2-
norm (`2). Flipping one pixel’s RGB value, for example,
from black (0, 0, 0) to white (1, 1, 1) yields an `0 difference
for this pixel of 3 and an `2 difference of
√
3.
3.1. Distortion-minimizing Attack
Given a synthetically-generated image x that is classified
by f(·) as fake, we begin by constructing a small additive
perturbation δ so that x+ δ is instead incorrectly classified
as real. A standard approach for computing an “optimal”
perturbation δ relies on minimizing the p-norm ‖δ‖p for
p = {0, 1, 2,∞} [11]. Although the p-norm does not neces-
sarily capture perceptual differences, for sufficiently small
norms, such optimizations suffice to create impercetible im-
age perturbations while revealing a classifier’s fragility. Ad-
ditionally, if attacks are possible under these p-norms, then
attacks under less constrained norms are likely to be even
more effective [11, 21].
While there are plethora of attacks, most follow a simple
two-step process [31]: (1) choose a loss function L(x + δ)
so that L(·) is minimized when f(x + δ) is misclassified;
and (2) minimize the loss function L(·) to obtain a pertur-
bation δ that succeeds in decreasing classification accuracy.
For the simple two-class problems (e.g., real or fake), where
f(x) is a scalar and our objective is to misclassify the image
x as real, it suffices to choose L(x) = f(x).
In this setting we first describe an attack that directly
minimizes the magnitude of the perturbation δ such that the
resulting adversarial examples are classified as real. Let τ
be a threshold such that when f(x) < τ , an image is classi-
fied as real.3 The adversary then solves the following opti-
mization problem:
arg min
δ
(‖δ‖p), such that f(x+ δ) < τ. (1)
This optimization formulation, however, is computationally
intractable with standard gradient descent due to the non-
linear inequality constraint [40]. We, therefore, reformulate
this optimization with a Lagrangian relaxation, which lends
itself to a tractable gradient-descent optimization:
arg min
δ
(
‖δ‖2 + cf(x+ δ)
)
, (2)
3A drawback of this style of attack is that it requires a hard decision
threshold τ . In practice the value of this threshold depends on the accept-
able false positive rate. We set τ = 5%, a high value considering the low
base rate of synthetic images in the wild.
where c is a hyper-parameter that controls the trade-off be-
tween minimizing the norm of the perturbation δ with mini-
mizing the loss f(·). A larger value of c results in adversar-
ial examples that are over-optimized (and more adversarial
than they need to be), whereas a smaller value of c results in
a perturbation that is small – as desired – but not adversarial.
The optimization of Equation (2) proceeds as follows.
For a given hyper-parameter c, the optimal δ is determined
using gradient-descent minimization with the Adam opti-
mizer [27] for 1, 000 iterations. An approximately optimal
hyper-parameter c is found through a binary search as fol-
lows. We initially consider values of c0 = 0 and c1 = 100
(or some sufficiently large value so that the attack is suc-
cessful). The attack is then run with c = 12 (c0 + c1). If the
attack is successful, then c1 = c, otherwise c0 = c. This
process is repeated until c0 = c1.
This attack is effective but leads to such small distor-
tions as to be impractical. In particular, saving the resulting
adversarial image as an uncompressed PNG obliterates the
attack because the image is quantized to 8-bits per color
channel.
We consider, therefore, a refinement to the `0-distortion
attack from [11] in which instead of minimizing the `2 dis-
tortion, we minimize the fraction of pixels whose lowest-
order bit needs to be flipped so that the image is misclassi-
fied. To do this, the above `2 attack is applied with an addi-
tional constraint that the maximum perturbation to any pixel
is 1/255. After an adversarial image is generated, all pix-
els with the smallest perturbation are reset to their original
value and these pixels are disallowed from future change.
The attack then repeats, iteratively shrinking the set of per-
turbed pixels until convergence. With a maximum perturba-
tion of 1/255, this attack modifies a subset of pixels by, at
most, flipping a pixel’s lowest-order bit. In such an attack,
the resulting adversarial image can be saved as an uncom-
pressed PNG or even compressed JPEG image and still be
misclassified.
Attacking Wang et al. [42]. Directly applying this `2-
distortion minimizing attack is highly effective at attack-
ing this forensic classifier. At a fixed false positive rate of
5%, an `2-distortion of 0.02 reduces the true positive rate to
chance performance of 50%, while an `2-distortion of 0.1
reduces the true positive rate to just 0.1%.
Compared to the `2-distortion of 0.02 that reduces this
forensic classifier to chance performance, reducing an Ima-
geNet classifier (using the same model architecture on im-
ages of the same size) to chance performance requires a dis-
tortion over 16 times larger [11]. These extremely small
distortions suggest that the forensic classifier is highly sen-
sitive and vulnerable to attack.
The `0-distortion minimizing attack is equally effective.
Shown in Figure 2(a) is the percent of fake images misclas-
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Figure 2. The required `0-distortion to fool the classifier into iden-
tifying (a) fake images as real or (b) real images as fake. Half of all
fake images are misclassified as real by flipping the lowest-order
bit of just 1% of pixels. Half of all real images are misclassified
as fake by flipping the lowest-order bit of less than 7% of pixels.
sified as real as a function of the percent of modified pixels:
with only 2% pixel changes, 71.3% of images are misclas-
sified; with only 4% pixel changes, 89.7% of images are
misclassified; and with less than 11% pixel changes, nearly
all images are misclassified.
Attacking Frank et al. [19]. After we developed the
above attack, Frank et al. [19] released their study and cor-
responding pre-trained classifiers. A similar attack was ap-
plied to this classifier. This classifier not only detects if an
image is synthetically-generated, but also predicts the iden-
tity of the generator. We therefore slightly modified our
attack: instead of reporting success on any misclassification
(e.g., reporting that a ProGAN image was generated by Big-
GAN), we only report success if the image is classified as
real. Despite this increased discriminative performance, we
find that we can reduce the true positive rate of the classi-
fier on images generated by ProGAN from 99% to 0% by
flipping the lowest-order bit of 50% of the pixels.
Reverse attack. Each of the previous attacks were de-
signed to misclassify fake images as real. We find that it
is also possible to generate adversarial perturbations that
cause real images to be misclassified as fake. Somewhat
surprisingly, this attack is harder, requiring a larger distor-
tion: just under 7% of the pixels must be flipped in a real
image to lead to 50% misclassification, as compared to 1%
of pixels required to lead to the same level of misclassifica-
tion of a fake image (see Figure 2(b)).
3.2. Loss-Maximizing Attack
In this second attack, we define a simpler objective func-
tion that maximizes the likelihood that a fake image x per-
turbed by δ is misclassified as real, but this time the p-norm
of the distortion is fixed to be less than a specified threshold
. This optimization is formulated as:
arg min
δ s.t. ‖δ‖p<
f(x+ δ). (3)
Unlike the previous Equation (2), this optimization is sim-
pler because it does not require a search over the additional
hyper-parameter. A standard gradient-descent optimization
is used to solve for the optimal perturbation δ [31].
This attack is also highly effective. Shown in Figure 3(a)
is the trade-off between the false positive rate (incorrectly
classifying a fake image as real) and the true positive rate
(correctly classifying a fake image as fake) for a range of the
fraction of modified pixels, between 0.0 (non-adversarial)
and 1.0 (maximally adversarial). The solid curves corre-
spond to the adversarial images saved in the JPEG format
and the dashed curves correspond to the PNG format. Even
with flipping the lowest-order bit of 40% of pixels for un-
compressed images, the AUC reduces from 0.966 to 0.27.
3.3. Universal Adversarial-Patch Attack
There is one significant limitation with the prior ap-
proaches in that the adversary is required to construct a tai-
lored attack for each image – at under 0.1 seconds per im-
age attack, our attacks are not especially costly, but the extra
work may not be desirable.
To remedy this limitation, we create a single visible noise
pattern that when overlaid on any fake image will result in
the image being classified as real [9]. Unlike the previous
image-specific attacks, we generate a single universal patch
that can be overlaid onto any fake image that then leads
to misclassification. Similar to Equation (3), the universal
patch δ is generated by maximizing the expected loss of the
classifier on a set of training examples X:
arg min
δ
∑
x∈X
[
f(xδ))
]
, (4)
where xδ denotes the input image x overlaid with the patch
δ, fixed to be 1% (24× 24 pixel) of the input image size.
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Figure 3. Shown in each panel is the ROC curves for a forensic-
classifier [42] before and after four distinct attacks: (a) classifica-
tion accuracy for the originally synthesized images saved as JPEG
(solid blue) and PNG (dashed blue) images and white-box adver-
sarial images with varying fractions of flipped pixels; (b-c) classi-
fication accuracy for the originally synthesized images (solid blue)
and white-box adversarial images (dashed orange); and (d) classi-
fication accuracy for StyleGAN synthesized images for the foren-
sic classifier of [42] (solid blue), our forensic classifier (dashed
blue), and our black-box adversarial images (dashed orange).
A standard gradient-descent optimization is, again, used
to maximize this objective function. On each gradient-
descent iteration, a new image x ∈ X is selected from a
subset of 5, 000 images taken from the original 94, 036 im-
age dataset, and disjoint from the 10, 000 evaluation images.
Shown in Figure 4(a) are two synthesized images with
the overlaid patch (upper left corner) that are now classified
as real with likelihood 98% and 86%. Shown in Figure 3(b)
is the trade-off between the false positive rate and the true
positive rate for the classifier when presented with the orig-
inal images (solid blue curve) and the adversarial images
(dashed orange curve). The AUC is reduced from 0.966 to
0.085.
3.4. Universal Latent-Space Attack
Each of the three previous attacks modified the input im-
age x by a perturbation δ to yield an adversarial image that
is misclassified by the forensic classifier. In this fourth, and
final, white-box attack, we introduce a latent-space attack
on images in which the underlying representation used by
adversarial fake adversarial fake
(a)
fake adversarial fake
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 4. Shown in row (a) are two adversarial examples in which
a universal image patch is overlaid on a fake image causing it to be
classified as real with high confidence. Shown in rows (b)-(d) are
fake images (left) and their adversarial counterpart (right) created
using a universal latent-space attack – each of these adversarial
images are misclassified as real with high confidence.
the generative model is modified to yield an adversarial im-
age. Here, we focus exclusively on images synthesized us-
ing StyleGAN [25].
Recall that we earlier formulated the generative model,
g : Z → X , as taking as input a vector in a latent space
z ∈ Z and outputting a color image x ∈ X . Recent gen-
erative models take two inputs, g : Z × W → X , where
z ∈ Z corresponds to high-level attributes and w ∈ W cor-
responds to low-level attributes. When synthesizing faces,
for example, high-level attributes may correspond to gen-
der, pose, skin color, and hair color or length, whereas low-
level attributes may correspond to the presence of freckles.
Our latent-space attack constructs a single (universal) at-
tribute w˜ ∈ W so that the resulting synthesized image,
g(z, w˜) is misclassified by the forensic classifier f(·) as
real.
As before, we apply a gradient-descent optimization to
determine the universal adversarial perturbation. On each
iteration, we sample a random latent vector z and then max-
imize the loss of the classifier with respect to a single w˜.
Specifically, we sample an initial random w˜0 ∼ W and then
on each iteration i, update w˜i+1 = w˜i + ∇w˜f(g(z; w˜i))
where each z ∈ Z is chosen at random.
Shown in Figure 4(b)-(d) are representative examples of
this attack. Shown in the left column are images synthe-
sized with random, non-adversarial, attributes w. Shown in
the right column are images synthesized with the universal
adversarial attribute w˜. Although these images are not iden-
tical, they are nearly indistinguishable and the adversarial
images are equally photorealistic.
Shown in Figure 3(c) is the trade-off between the false
positive rate and the true positive rate for the classifier when
presented with the original StyleGAN images (solid blue
curve) and the adversarial images (dashed orange curve).
The AUC is reduced from 0.99 to 0.17.
4. Black-Box Attack
In practice, forensic classifiers for detecting synthesized
images may not be publicly released in order to make it
difficult to launch the type of white-box attacks we de-
scribe previously. Social networks or dating sites, for ex-
ample, might analyze all portrait photos and reject or label
synthetically-generated images. In such cases, an adversary
will not be able to perform gradient-descent optimizations
on the model weights described in the previous section.
A black-box threat model corresponds to the situation
when the adversary does not have access to the exact details
of the forensic classifier, but is aware what type of classi-
fier is in place. Defenses are only interesting if they remain
secure against an adversary who is aware they are present;
“security through obscurity” is not a valid defense [5]. As
such, the black-box threat model assumes that the adversary
knows that there is a defense in place, and similarly knows
the general strategy of the defense.
We find that forensic classifiers are vulnerable to adver-
sarial examples even in this more restrictive black-box set-
ting. To mount these attacks, we make use of the transfer-
ability property of adversarial examples [36, 30]. Consider
two forensic classifiers, a source classifier f1(·) and a tar-
get classifier f2(·), both trained to perform the same task.
An adversarial input x that is misclassified by f1(·) is also
likely to be misclassified by f2(·), even if these source and
target classifiers are different neural-network architectures,
trained with different algorithms on different training data.
This source to target transferability works because the deci-
sion boundaries learned by different classifiers, solving the
same underlying problem, are sufficiently similar that ad-
versarial examples transfer between classifiers [30].
In order to transfer an attack to the target detector of
Wang et al. [42], we develop our own forensic classifier. We
collect one million ProGAN-generated images and one mil-
lion real images on which ProGAN was trained. We then
train a ResNet-18 (as compared to Wang et al.’s ResNet-
50) to classify images as fake or real. Unlike Wang et al.,
our classifier was not pre-trained on ImageNet. We apply
the standard ImageNet transformations: randomly crop a
224 × 224 pixel bounding box from each input image; and
horizontally flip each real image with a 50% probability.
Our classifier achieves an overall AUC of 0.85, signifi-
cantly less than the AUC of 0.96 achieved by Wang et al..
As we will see next, despite the differences in the training
arhitecture and data, and the lower accuracy of our source
classifier, we are still able to transfer an attack from our
classifier to Wang et al.’s classifier.
We first generated white-box adversarial examples on
our source classifier using the previously described `0-
distortion minimizing attack (with a distortion bound of
1/255 per pixel – the smallest distortion bound that can still
be saved to a PNG). These adversarial examples reduce our
source classifier’s AUC from 0.85 to 0.003. Shown in Fig-
ure 3(d) is the effect of transferring these exact adversarial
examples to Wang et al.’s classifier. This attack reduces the
target classifier AUC from 0.96 to 0.22.
While this is the weakest of all attacks that we have pre-
sented it is not weak as it drives the forensic classifier to be-
low chance performance. This attack is also the most realis-
tic since in practice, attacks will likely need to be mounted
within this black-box threat model.
5. Discussion
Motivating the Rules. Having demonstrated the vulnera-
bility of forensic classifiers under the standard perturbation-
based, adversarial machine-learning threat model, we now
turn to the fundamental question posed by Gilmer et
al. [21]: is an actual adversary limited to perturbation at-
tacks? We believe that the answer in this setting is firmly
no. It is not realistic to require that an adversary only ap-
ply an indistinguishable perturbation to an image to cause
misclassification. True adversaries will have a much larger
space of valid actions to operate under. For example, even
standard image laundering – resizing, rescaling, cropping,
or recompression – often reduces the true positive rate by
over ten percentage points. A naive adversary might still
succeed through these techniques alone, without needing to
resort to more powerful, but also more complicated, attacks.
Further, an adversary does not necessarily need one par-
ticular image to be identified as real, but rather some seman-
tically similar image to be classified as real. For example,
the exact image of Mr. Walz shown in Figure 1 was not es-
sential to create a fictional congressional candidate’s Twit-
ter account – any number of photorealistic portrait photos
would have sufficed. As such, even if Twitter was using a
forensic classifier to scan portrait photos for synthetically-
generated content, an adversary would need only repeatedly
upload different photos until one simply failed detection.
Even with a relatively high true positive rate of 90%, an
adversary would need only upload, on average, ten images
before the classifier failed to detect a fake image.
Even though we only considered attacks that are harder
than the attacks that might actually be applied in reality,
we still believe that it is worthwhile to study this worst-
case, low-distortion perturbation attacks. While clearly this
is not the only possible attack, it is highly restrictive and
therefore difficult to execute. Given the relative ease with
which we were able to make this restrictive attack succeed,
other attacks with fewer constraints are likely to be even
easier to execute.
Who goes first? A second important question to consider
in these types of defender/forger situations is which agent
goes first and which agent has to react. In a traditional situ-
ation, the defender acts first, releasing some product or ser-
vice, and then the forger responds, looking for vulnerabili-
ties. In this situation, the forger has the advantage because
she need only construct one successful attack whereas the
defender has to prevent all possible attacks. In other sce-
narios, the forger commits to a particular approach and the
defender reacts, adjusting her defenses accordingly. In prac-
tice, either scenario is possible. Twitter might, for example,
deploy a forensic classifier to classify uploaded profile pho-
tos as real or fake. The forger could then modify her gen-
erator to defeat the classifier. Alternatively, a fact-checking
organization might retroactively apply a forensic classifier
over historical news photos. In this scenario, the defender
is likely to know the forger’s potential synthesis techniques.
Ultimately, the ordering is effectively a matter of the
time-scale being considered. On a relatively short time-
scale of hours to days, if the forger goes second, then she
will have the advantage. On a longer time-scale of months
to years, the defender will eventually have knowledge of the
forger’s techniques and will have the advantage of retroac-
tively finding the fakes. On the internet, however, where, for
example, the half-life of a tweet is on the order of minutes,
the game is over in the first few hours, giving the forger an
inherent advantage.
Figure 5. Mean perturbation for the forensics classifier of [42]
(left) and an ImageNet classifier (right) needed to lead to misclas-
sification.
Classifier Sensitivity. We find that the forensic detec-
tors require perturbations roughly 10 times smaller than
necessary to fool ImageNet classifiers, also operating on
224 × 224 images. In order to better understand why these
detectors are so sensitive, we compute the average perturba-
tion necessary to fool the forensic classifier of [42]. This is
done by averaging the adversarial perturbation introduced
on 2000 adversarial StyleGAN examples in the released
dataset of [42]. Shown in Figure 5 is a contrast-enhanced
version of this average perturbation and, for comparison, the
average perturbation required to fool an ImageNet ResNet-
50 classifier (the same architecture used by the forensic
classifier). The forensic-classifier perturbation consists of
highly reqular structure aligned with the 8×8 JPEG lattice.
We suspect, but have not yet confirmed, that this points to a
possible JPEG artifact in the underlying training data.
Counter-Defenses. Extensive efforts have attempted to
defend against adversarial examples on standard image
classification [34, 44, 33, 10, 43]. Almost all proposed de-
fenses, however, have been shown to be ineffective at in-
creasing classification robustness, and leave accuracy at 0%
even under small distortion bounds [6, 41]. The two most
effective defenses on large images have been adversarial
training [31] and randomized smoothing [28, 15]. Adver-
sarial training continuously trains on adversarial examples
generated on previous versions of the classifier. In con-
trast, randomized smoothing adds large magnitude, Gaus-
sian noise to every pixel, (provably) making it impossible
for any small perturbation to change the classifier output.
We believe that it would be interesting to study the efficacy
of these two counter-defense strategies on detecting syn-
thesized images. Because adversarial training only offers
limited robustness on traditional image classification tasks,
and because detecting synthesized images is an even harder
problem, it may be difficult to obtain meaningful robustness
through adversarial training alone.
6. Conclusions
To the extent that synthesized or manipulated content is
used for nefarious purposes, the problem of detecting this
content is inherently adversarial. We argue, therefore, that
forensic classifiers need to build an adversarial model into
their defenses. This model must go beyond the standard
laundering attacks of recompression, resizing, blurring, or
adding white noise.
Adversarial modeling is particularly important in the
types of data-driven, machine-learning based techniques de-
scribed here. We have shown that these techniques, are
highly vulnerable to attack because the same power and
flexibility of the underlying neural-network classifiers that
leads to high classification accuracies, can also be easily
manipulated to create adversarial images that easily subvert
detection. This subversion takes the form of white-box at-
tacks in which it is assumed that the details of the forensic
classifier are known, and black-box attacks in which it is
assumed that only a forensic classifier, of unknown detail,
exists. These attacks can imperceptibly modify fake images
so that they are misclassified as real, or imperceptibly mod-
ify real images so that they are misclassified as fake.
It may be argued that white-box attacks are not a signif-
icant threat because, in critical scenarios, the details of the
forensic classifier can be withheld. We have shown, how-
ever, the efficacy of black-box attacks in which the classifier
details are not known – the threat posted by these attacks is
surely more significant.
We have shown the efficacy of these types of attacks on
two previously published forensic classifiers, and a classi-
fier of our own creation. Previous results from the adver-
sarial machine learning literature [40, 11], however, suggest
that this vulnerability is inherent to all neural-network based
forensic classifiers [23].
Demonstrating attacks on sensitive systems is not some-
thing that should be taken lightly, or done simply for sport.
However, if such forensic classifiers are currently deployed,
the false sense of security they provide may be worse than if
they were not deployed at all – not only would a fake profile
picture appear authentic, now it would be given additional
credibility by a forensic classifier.
Even if forensic classifiers are eventually defeated by a
committed adversary, these classifiers are still valuable in
that they make it more difficult and time consuming to cre-
ate a convincing fake. They would, for example, have made
it more difficult for a 17-year old high school student to
create a realistic image to use in the creation of a fictional
congressional candidate on social media. While this is unar-
guably a low bar, continued efforts to increase the resilience
of forensic classifiers will raise this bar, eventually making
it more difficult for the average person to distribute convinc-
ing and undetectable deep-fake images.
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